Institutions and the performance of politically connected MandAs

Journal of International Business Studies

Volumn 44, Issue 8, 2013, Pages 833-852

  Brockman, Paul ^a   Rui, Oliver M ^a   Zou, Huan ^a  

^a LEHIGH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

cross border mergers and acquisitions (M As); institutions and international business; political connections

Indexed keywords

EID: 84886909417     PISSN: 00472506     EISSN: 14786990     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1057/jibs.2013.37     Document Type: Article

References (44)

1. Barber, B. M., & Lyon, J. D. 1996. Detecting abnormal operating performance: The empirical power and specification of test statistics. Journal of Financial Economics, 41(3): 359-399. (Pubitemid 126169750)
2. Bertrand, M., Kramarz, F., Schoar, A., & Thesmar, D. 2008. Politicians, firms and the political business cycle: Evidence from France. Working paper, University of Chicago.
3. Bloomberg Businessweek. 2009. Opel sale hits a snag. 19 September, http://www.businessweek.com/autos/autobeat/archives/2009/10/opel-sale-hits.html.
4. Bris, A., & Cabolis, C. 2008. The value of investor protection: Firm evidence from cross-border mergers. Review of Financial Studies, 21(2): 605-648.
5. Bunkanwanicha, P., & Wiwattanakantang, Y. 2009. Big business owners in politics. Review of Financial Studies, 22(6): 2133-2168.
6. Chen, C. J. P., Ding, Y., & Kim, C. F. 2010. High-level politically connected firms, corruption, and analyst forecast accuracy around the world. Journal of International Business Studies, 41(9): 1505-1524.
7. Chen, X., Harford, J., & Li, K. 2007. Monitoring: Which institutions matter? Journal of Financial Economics, 86(2): 279-305.
8. Claessens, S., Feijen, E., & Laeven, L. 2008. Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions. Journal of Financial Economics, 88(3): 554-580.
9. Cull, R., & Xu, L. C. 2005. Institutions, ownership, and finance: The determinants of profit reinvestment among Chinese firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 77(1): 117-146. (Pubitemid 40829505)
10. Dehejia, R. H., & Wahba, S. 1999. Causal effects in non-experimental studies: Reevaluating the evaluation of training programs. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 94(448): 1053-1062.
11. Desai, R. M., & Olofsgård, A. 2008. Do politically connected firms undermine their own competitiveness? Evidence from developing countries. Working paper.
12. Dinc, I. S. 2005. Politicians and banks: Political influences on government-owned banks in emerging markets. Journal of Financial Economics, 77(2): 453-479. (Pubitemid 40975910)
13. Dinc, I. S., & Erel, I. forthcoming. Economic nationalism in mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Finance, in press.
14. Duchin, R., & Sosyura, D. 2012. The politics of government investment. Journal of Financial Economics, 106(1): 24-48.The Economist. 2011. The Italian crisis: Addio, Silvio. 12 November.
15. Faccio, M. 2006. Politically connected firms. American Economic Review, 96(1): 369-386. (Pubitemid 43550725)
16. Faccio, M. 2010. Differences between politically connected and nonconnected firms: A cross-country analysis. Financial Management, 39(3): 905-927.
17. Faccio, M., Masulis, R. W., & McConnell, J. J. 2006. Political connections and corporate bailouts. Journal of Finance, 61(6): 2597-2635.
18. Fan, J. P. H., Wong, T. J., & Zhang, T. 2007. Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and post-IPO performance of China's newly partially privatized firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 84(2): 330-357.
19. Fisman, R. 2001. Estimating the value of political connections. American Economic Review, 91(4): 1095-1102. (Pubitemid 33596447)
20. Goldman, E., So, J., & Rocholl, J. 2009. Do politically connected boards affect firm value? Review of Financial Studies, 22(6): 2331-2360.
21. Goldman, E., So, J., & Rocholl, J. 2011. Politically connected boards of directors and the allocation of procurement contracts. Working Paper.
22. Habib, M., & Zurawicki, L. 2002. Corruption and foreign direct investment. Journal of International Business Studies, 33(2): 291-307.
23. Hillman, A. J., Zardkoohi, A., & Bierman, L. 1999. Corporate political strategies and firm performance: Indications of firmspecific benefits from personal service in the US government. Strategic Management Journal, 20(1): 67-81. (Pubitemid 129545436)
24. Hope, O.-K., Thomas, W., & Vyas, D. M. 2011. The cost of pride: Why do firms from developing countries bid higher? Journal of International Business Studies, 42(1): 128-151.
25. Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review, 76(2): 323-329.
26. Jensen, M. C., & Ruback, R. S. 1983. The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 11(1-4): 5-50.
27. Johnson, S., & Mitton, T. 2003. Cronyism and capital controls: Evidence from Malaysia. Journal of Financial Economics, 67(2): 351-382. (Pubitemid 36027701)
28. Karolyi, G. A., & Liao, R. 2009. What is different about governmentcontrolled acquirers in cross-border acquisitions? Unpublished working paper, Cornell University.
29. Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. 2010. The worldwide governance indicators: Methodology and analytical issues. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430.
30. Khwaja, A. I., & Mian, A. 2005. Do lenders favor politically connected firms? Rent provision in an emerging financial market. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(4): 1371-1411. (Pubitemid 43152762)
31. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. 1998. Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106(6): 1113-1155. (Pubitemid 29181957)
32. Masulis, R. W., Wang, C., & Xie, F. 2007. Corporate governance and acquirer returns. Journal of Finance, 62(4): 1851-1889.
33. Mauro, P. 1995. Corruption and growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(3): 681-712.
34. McMillan, J., & Woodruff, C. 1999. Inter-firm relationships and informal credit in Vietnam. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(4): 1285-1320.
35. Petersen, M. A. 2009. Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing approaches. Review of Financial Studies, 22(1): 435-480.
36. Reeb, D. M., Sakakibara, M., & Mahmood, I. P. 2012. From the editors: Endogeneity in international business research. Journal of International Business Studies, 43(3): 211-218.
37. Roll, R. 1986. The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers. Journal of Business, 59(2): 197-216.
38. Rosenbaum, P. R., & Rubin, D. B. 1983. The central role of the propensity score in observational studies for causal effects. Biometrika, 70(1): 41-55.
39. Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. 1993. Corruption. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3): 599-617.
40. Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. 1994. Politicians and firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4): 995-1025.
41. Story, L., & Becker, J. 2009. Bank chief tells of US pressure to buy Merrill Lynch. New York Times 11 June.
42. Tucker, J. W. 2010. Selection bias and econometric remedies in accounting and finance research. Journal of Accounting Literature, 29: 31-57.
43. Uzzi, B. 1999. Embeddedness in the making of financial capital: How social relations and networks benefit firms seeking financing. American Sociological Review, 64(4): 481-505. (Pubitemid 29509078)
44. Wu, W., Wu, C., & Rui, O. M. 2012. Ownership and the value of political connections: Evidence from China. European Financial Management, 18(4): 695-729.