How the supreme court alters opinion language to evade congressional review

Journal of Law and Courts

Volumn 1, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 35-59

  Owens, Ryan J ^a   Wedeking, Justin ^b   Wohlfarth, Patrick C ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84885661214     PISSN: 21646570     EISSN: 21646589     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/668482     Document Type: Article

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