An alternative perspective on supreme court agenda setting in a system of shared powers

Justice System Journal

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 183-204

  Owens, Ryan J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 80053972899     PISSN: 0098261X     EISSN: 23277556     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/0098261X.2011.10767987     Document Type: Article

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