Adding recess appointments to the president's "tool chest" of unilateral powers

Political Research Quarterly

Volumn 60, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 645-654

  Black, Ryan C ^a   Madonna, Anthony J ^a   Owens, Ryan J ^a   Lynch, Michael S ^b  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS   (United States)

Author keywords

Congress presidential relations; Presidential powers; Recess appointments; Separation of powers; Unilateral presidency

Indexed keywords

EID: 36649032049     PISSN: 10659129     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1065912907307541     Document Type: Article

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