Pursuing Meaning

Pursuing Meaning

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 1-272

  Borg, Emma ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF READING   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Contextualism; Indexicalism; Lexical semantics; Mindreading; Minimal semantics; Minimalism; Occasionalism; Referential expressions; Semantic internalism; Semantic relativism; Speaker intentions; Word meaning

Indexed keywords

EID: 84885344168     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588374.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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