Stochastic stability and the evolution of coordination in spatially structured populations

Theoretical Population Biology

Volumn 89, Issue , 2013, Pages 75-87

  Van Cleve, Jeremy ^a   Lehmann, Laurent ^b  

^a SANTA FE INSTITUTE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LAUSANNE   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

N player game; Relatedness; Risk dominance; Stag hunt

Indexed keywords

EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGY; FITNESS; GAME THEORY; PHENOTYPIC PLASTICITY; POPULATION STRUCTURE; RELATEDNESS; RISK ASSESSMENT; SPATIAL ANALYSIS; STOCHASTICITY;

ANIMALIA;

-PLAYER GAME; ARTICLE; EVOLUTION; PROBABILITY; RELATEDNESS; RISK; RISK DOMINANCE; STAG HUNT; STATISTICS;

-PLAYER GAME; RELATEDNESS; RISK DOMINANCE; STAG HUNT;

BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; PROBABILITY; RISK; STOCHASTIC PROCESSES;

EID: 84884698008     PISSN: 00405809     EISSN: 10960325     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2013.08.006     Document Type: Article

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