Cooperation in Community Interaction Without Information Flows

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 63, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 491-519

  Ghosh, Parikshit ^a   Ray, Debraj ^a  

^a BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001203076     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2297892     Document Type: Article

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