Cheap-talk advertising and misrepresentation in vertically differentiated markets

Marketing Science

Volumn 32, Issue 4, 2013, Pages 609-621

  Gardete, Pedro M ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Advertising; Analytic models; Marketing strategy; Targeting

Indexed keywords

EID: 84880965536     PISSN: 07322399     EISSN: 1526548X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mksc.2013.0772     Document Type: Article

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