(Noisy) communication

Quantitative Marketing and Economics

Volumn 5, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 211-237

  Anand, Bharat N ^a,b   Shachar, Ron ^c,d  

^a HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

^b Tel Aviv University ^*  (United States)

^c TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^d DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Communication; Information; Signaling

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548716892     PISSN: 15707156     EISSN: 1573711X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11129-007-9028-2     Document Type: Article

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