The revealed preference theory of stable and extremal stable matchings

Econometrica

Volumn 81, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 153-171

  Echenique, Federico ^a   Lee, Sangmok ^b   Shum, Matthew ^a   Yenmez, M Bumin ^c  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^c CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Assignment game; Extremal stability; Revealed preference theory; Stability; Two sided matching markets

Indexed keywords

EID: 84879746695     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: 14680262     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3982/ECTA10011     Document Type: Article

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