What matchings can be stable? the testable implications of matching theory

Mathematics of Operations Research

Volumn 33, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 757-768

  Echenique, Federico ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Inverse optimization; Revealed preference; Stable matchings

Indexed keywords

IF THERE ARES; INVERSE OPTIMIZATION; MATCHING THEORIES; REVEALED PREFERENCE; STABLE MATCHINGS;

OPTIMIZATION;

EID: 61349110164     PISSN: 0364765X     EISSN: 15265471     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/moor.1080.0318     Document Type: Article

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