On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play

Theory of Computing Systems

Volumn 53, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 41-52

  Brandt, Felix ^a   Fischer, Felix ^b   Harrenstein, Paul ^c  

^a TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Fictitious play; Game theory; Nash equilibrium; Rate of convergence

Indexed keywords

CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS; CONSTANT-SUM GAME; EXPONENTIAL NUMBERS; FICTITIOUS PLAY; NASH EQUILIBRIA; POTENTIAL GAMES; RATE OF CONVERGENCE; SIMPLE LEARNING ALGORITHMS;

GAME THEORY; LEARNING ALGORITHMS; TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

APPROXIMATION THEORY;

EID: 84878514219     PISSN: 14324350     EISSN: 14330490     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00224-013-9460-5     Document Type: Article

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