Structural leverage and fictitious play in sequential auctions

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2002, Pages 385-390

  Zhu, Weili ^a   Wurman, Peter R ^a  

^a North Carolina State University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTER SOFTWARE; GAME THEORY; MONTE CARLO METHODS; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 0036927341     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (14)

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