Learning in games with strategic complementarities revisited

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 143, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 292-301

  Berger, Ulrich ^a  

^a VIENNA UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Austria)

Author keywords

Fictitious play; Learning process; Ordinal complementarities; Strategic complementarities

Indexed keywords

EID: 55549147889     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.01.007     Document Type: Article

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