On the hardness and existence of quasi-strict equilibria

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4997 LNCS, Issue , 2008, Pages 291-302

  Brandt, Felix ^a   Fischer, Felix ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; GAME THEORY; HARDNESS; THREE DIMENSIONAL COMPUTER GRAPHICS;

BIMATRIX GAMES; LINEAR PROGRAMS; QUASI-STRICT EQUILIBRIA;

PHASE EQUILIBRIA;

EID: 44449101633     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_26     Document Type: Conference Paper

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