Approximation guarantees for fictitious play

2009 47th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2009

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 636-643

  Conitzer, Vincent ^a  

^a Duke University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION PROPERTIES; FICTITIOUS PLAY; LEARNING TO PLAY; LINEAR PROGRAMS; LOWER BOUNDS; OPTIMAL APPROXIMATION; PROBABILITY PROPORTIONAL; RANDOM GAMES; UPPER BOUND; WORST CASE;

LEARNING ALGORITHMS;

EID: 77949631207     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/ALLERTON.2009.5394918     Document Type: Conference Paper

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