Performance appraisals and the impact of forced distribution-an experimental investigation

Management Science

Volumn 59, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 54-68

  Berger, Johannes ^a   Harbring, Christine ^b,c   Sliwka, Dirk ^a,c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

^b RWTH AACHEN UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^c IZA   (Germany)

^d CESIFO   (Germany)

Author keywords

Experiment; Forced distribution; Forced ranking; Motivation; Performance measurement

Indexed keywords

BASE-LINE CONDITIONS; CLEAR CUTS; DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS; EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS; FORCED DISTRIBUTION; FORCED RANKING; PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL; PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS; PRIOR EXPERIENCE;

EXPERIMENTS; MOTIVATION; PRODUCTIVITY;

SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL;

EID: 84874143126     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1120.1624     Document Type: Article

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