Triadic consensus: A randomized algorithm for voting in a crowd

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 7695 LNCS, Issue , 2012, Pages 434-447

  Goel, Ashish ^a   Lee, David ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONDORCET WINNER; HIGH PROBABILITY; IF THERE ARE; NASH EQUILIBRIA; RANDOMIZED ALGORITHMS; VOTING PROTOCOLS; VOTING RULES;

GAME THEORY; INTERNET; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS;

INTERNET PROTOCOLS;

EID: 84871376151     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_32     Document Type: Conference Paper

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