Can approximation circumvent Gibbard-Satterthwaite?

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 2, Issue , 2010, Pages 836-841

  Procaccia, Ariel D ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

APPROXIMATION RATIOS; LOWER AND UPPER BOUNDS; MAXIMIN; POSITIONAL SCORING RULES; RANDOMIZED RULES; STRATEGY PROOFS; VOTING RULES;

COMPUTATION THEORY;

EID: 77958535703     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (20)

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