Approximately strategy-proof voting

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 67-72

  Birrell, Eleanor ^a   Pass, Rafael ^a  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

LOWER BOUNDS; NEW APPROACHES; STRATEGY PROOFS; VOTING RULES;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 84871368003     PISSN: 10450823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-023     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (14)

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