Robust approximation and incremental elicitation in voting protocols

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 287-293

  Lu, Tyler ^a   Boutilier, Craig ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

MINIMAX REGRET; POLYNOMIAL-TIME ALGORITHMS; ROBUST APPROXIMATIONS; SCORING METRICS; VOTING PROTOCOLS; VOTING RULES; VOTING SCHEMES; WINNER DETERMINATION;

VIRTUAL REALITY;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 84863532748     PISSN: 10450823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-058     Document Type: Conference Paper

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