Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Volumn 85, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 495-527

  Nagel, Jennifer ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84869743423     PISSN: 00318205     EISSN: 19331592     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00634.x     Document Type: Article

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