Monkeys represent others' knowledge but not their beliefs

Developmental Science

Volumn 14, Issue 6, 2011, Pages 1406-1416

  Marticorena, Drew C W ^a   Ruiz, April M ^a   Mukerji, Cora ^a   Goddu, Anna ^a   Santos, Laurie R ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ANIMAL; ARTICLE; ATTENTION; COGNITION; EVOLUTION; HUMAN; MACACA MULATTA; PHYSIOLOGY; THEORY OF MIND; TIME; VIDEORECORDING;

ANIMALS; ATTENTION; BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; COGNITION; HUMANS; MACACA MULATTA; THEORY OF MIND; TIME FACTORS; VIDEO RECORDING;

EID: 80054928000     PISSN: 1363755X     EISSN: 14677687     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01085.x     Document Type: Article

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