On the impact of package selection in combinatorial auctions: An experimental study in the context of spectrum auction design

Experimental Economics

Volumn 15, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 667-692

  Scheffel, Tobias ^a   Ziegler, Georg ^a   Bichler, Martin ^a  

^a TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

Auctions; Group behavior; Individual behavior; Lab experiments

Indexed keywords

EID: 84868494116     PISSN: 13864157     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-012-9321-0     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. Ausubel, L., & Milgrom, P. (2006). The lovely but lonely Vickrey auction. In P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, & R. Steinberg (Eds.), Combinatorial auctions. Cambridge: MIT Press.
2. Ausubel, L., Cramton, P., & Milgrom, P. (2006). The clock-proxy auction: A practical combinatorial auction design. In P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, & R. Steinberg (Eds.), Combinatorial auctions. Cambridge: MIT Press.
3. Ausubel, L. M., Cramton, P., McAfee, R. P., & McMillan, J. (1997). Synergies in wireless telephony: Evidence from the broadband PCS auctions. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 6(3), 497-527.
4. Banks, J., Ledyard, J., & Porter, D. (1989). Allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources: An experimental approach. Rand Journal of Economics, 20, 1-25.
5. Banks, J., Olson, M., Porter, D., Rassenti, S., & Smith, V. (2003). Theory, experiment and the FCC spectrum auctions. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 51, 303-350.
6. Bichler, M., Shabalin, P., & Pikovsky, A. (2009). A computational analysis of linear-price iterative combinatorial auctions. Information Systems Research, 20(1), 33-59.
7. Brunner, C., Goeree, J. K., Holt, C., & Ledyard, J. (2010). An experimental test of flexible combinatorial spectrum auction formats. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2(1), 39-57.
8. Chen, Y., & Takeuchi, K. (2010). Multi-object auctions with package bidding: An experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA. Games and Economic Behavior, 68, 557-579.
9. Cowan, N. (2001). The magical number 4 in short-term memory: A reconsideration of mental storage capacity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 87-185.
10. Cramton, P. (2009a). Auctioning the digital dividend, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology.
11. Cramton, P. (2009b). Spectrum auction design. Papers of Peter Cramton 09sad, Department of Economics, University of Maryland. http://ideas. repec. org/p/pcc/pccumd/09sad. html.
12. Cramton, P., Shoham, Y., & Steinberg, R. (Eds.) (2006). Combinatorial auctions. Cambridge: MIT Press.
13. Goeree, J. K., & Holt, C. A. (2010). Hierarchical package bidding: A paper & pencil combinatorial auction. Games and Economic Behavior, 70(1), 146-169.
14. Güth, W., Levati, M., & Ploner, M. (2010). Satisficing in strategic environments: A theoretical approach and experimental evidence. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 39(5), 554-561.
15. Hastie, T., & Pregibon, D. (1992). Generalized linear models. In J. Chambers & T. Hastie (Eds.), Statistical models in S. Pacific Grove: Wasworth and Brooks/Cole.
16. Hoffman, K. (2011). Spectrum auctions. In J. Kennington, E. Olinick, & D. Rajan (Eds.), International series in operations research and management science: Vol. 158. Wireless network design (pp. 147-176). New York: Springer.
17. Isaac, R., & James, D. (2000). Robustness of the incentive compatible combinatorial auction. Experimental Economics, 3, 31-53.
18. Kagel, J. H., Lien, Y., & Milgrom, P. (2010). Ascending prices and package bidding: A theoretical and experimental analysis. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2(3), 160-185.
19. Kirchkamp, O., & Reiss, J. P. (2008). Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational markdown bidders-theory and experiment. Jena Economic Research Papers 66.
20. Kwasnica, T., JO, Ledyard, Porter, D., & DeMartini, C. (2005). A new and improved design for multi-objective iterative auctions. Management Science, 51(3), 419-434.
21. Ledyard, J., Porter, D., & Rangel, A. (1997). Experiments testing multiobject allocation mechanisms. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 6, 639-675.
22. Miller, G. A. (1956). The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for processing information. Psychological Review, 63, 81-97.
23. Moreton, P. S., & Spiller, P. T. (1998). What's in the air: Interlicense synergies in the Federal Communications Commission's broadband personal communication service spectrum auctions. Journal of Law & Economics, 41(2), 677-716.
24. Porter, D., & Smith, V. (2006). FCC license auction design: A 12-year experiment. Journal of Law Economics and Policy, 3(1), 63-80.
25. Porter, D., Rassenti, S., Roopnarine, A., & Smith, V. (2003). Combinatorial auction design. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 100, 11153-11157.
26. Rassenti, S., Smith, V. L., & Bulfin, R. L. (1982). A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocations. Bell Journal of Economics, 13, 402-417.
27. Rothkopf, M. H., Pekec, A., & Harstad, R. M. (1998). Computationally manageable combinatorial auctions. Management Science, 44, 1131-1147.
28. Scheffel, T., Pikovsky, A., Bichler, M., & Guler, K. (2011). An experimental comparison of linear and non-linear price combinatorial auctions. Information Systems Research, 22, 346-368.
29. Schneider, S., Shabalin, P., & Bichler, M. (2010). On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions. European Journal of Operational Research, 206, 248-259.
30. Simon, H. A. (1959). Theories of decision-making in economics and behavioral science. American Economic Review, 49, 253-283.