Efficient sourcing and debt financing in imperfect product markets

Management Science

Volumn 44, Issue 9, 1998, Pages 1167-1178

  Subramaniam, Venkat ^a  

^a TULANE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency Costs; Debt Financing; Hold up Problem; Monopsony; Sunk Investment

Indexed keywords

DECISION THEORY; MARKETING; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; OUTSOURCING; PROBLEM SOLVING; PURCHASING; QUALITY ASSURANCE; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

DEBT FINANCING; SUNK INVESTMENTS;

RISK MANAGEMENT;

EID: 0032154335     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.44.9.1167     Document Type: Article

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