Yardstick competition in a federation: Theory and evidence from China

China Economic Review

Volumn 23, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 878-897

  Caldeira, Emilie ^a  

^a Fondation pour les études et les Recherches sur le Développement International   (France)

Author keywords

China; Decentralization; Public spending interactions; Spatial panel data; Yardstick competition

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867638319     PISSN: 1043951X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2012.04.011     Document Type: Article

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