Yardstick competition and political agency problems

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 155-169

  Belleflamme, Paul ^a   Hindriks, Jean ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 17444383117     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0297-8     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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