What makes them follow the rules? Empirical evidence from turtle egg harvesters in Costa Rica

Marine Policy

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 270-277

  Madrigal Ballestero, Róger ^a   Schlüter, Achim ^b   Claudia Lopez, Maria ^c  

^a CATIE   (Costa Rica)

^b JACOBS UNIVERSITY BREMEN   (Germany)

^c PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD JAVERIANA   (Colombia)

Author keywords

Collective action; Compliance; Institutions; Monitoring; Olive ridley; Sanctioning

Indexed keywords

COLLECTIVE ACTION; COMPLIANCE; ECONOMETRICS; EGG; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; HARVESTING; MONITORING; PERCEPTION; SPECIES CONSERVATION; SUSTAINABILITY; TURTLE;

COSTA RICA;

CHELONIIDAE; LEPIDOCHELYS OLIVACEA; TESTUDINES;

EID: 84867335397     PISSN: 0308597X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2012.05.009     Document Type: Article

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