Regulatory compliance in Lake Victoria fisheries

Environment and Development Economics

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 197-217

  Eggert, Håkan ^a   Lokina, Razack B ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG   (Sweden)

^b UNIVERSITY OF DAR ES SALAAM   (Tanzania)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77951131003     PISSN: 1355770X     EISSN: 14697998     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1355770X09990106     Document Type: Article

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