Monitoring and sanctioning in the commons: An application to forestry

Ecological Economics

Volumn 68, Issue 7, 2009, Pages 2106-2113

  Coleman, Eric A ^a,b   Steed, Brian C ^b  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Community forestry; Monitoring; Sanctioning

Indexed keywords

ESTIMATION METHOD; FOREST RESOURCE; FORESTRY; MONITORING; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 64949118550     PISSN: 09218009     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.02.006     Document Type: Article

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