A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 133, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 441-466

  Ledyard, John O ^a   Palfrey, Thomas R ^b  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Incentive compatibility; Interim efficiency; Mechanism design; Private values; Public goods

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847287694     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.12.006     Document Type: Article

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