Assigning resources to budget-constrained agents

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 80, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 73-107

  Che, Yeon Koo ^a   Gale, Ian ^b   Kim, Jinwoo ^c  

^a Howard Hughes Medical Institute   (United States)

^b GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c Seoul National University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

Budget constrained agents; Cash subsidy; Random rationing; Resale

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC THEORY; MARKET; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; STOCHASTICITY; SUBSIDY SYSTEM;

EID: 84867303190     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/restud/rds025     Document Type: Article

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