메뉴 건너뛰기




Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 658-665

Truthful feedback for sanctioning reputation mechanisms

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 80053150645     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper
Times cited : (8)

References (11)
  • 2
    • 1642288293 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations
    • Cripps, M. W.; Mailath, G. J.; and Samuelson, L. 2004. Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations. Econometrica 72(2):407-432.
    • (2004) Econometrica , vol.72 , Issue.2 , pp. 407-432
    • Cripps, M.W.1    Mailath, G.J.2    Samuelson, L.3
  • 3
    • 30344448565 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Reputation mechanism design in online trading environments with pure moral hazard
    • DOI 10.1287/isre.1050.0054
    • Dellarocas, C. 2005. Reputation Mechanism Design in Online Trading Environments with Pure Moral Hazard. Information Systems Research 16(2):209-230. (Pubitemid 43057223)
    • (2005) Information Systems Research , vol.16 , Issue.2 , pp. 209-230
    • Dellarocas, C.1
  • 4
    • 33748549921 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • How often should reputation mechanisms update a trader's reputation profile?
    • DOI 10.1287/isre.1060.0092
    • Dellarocas, C. 2006. How Often Should Reputation Mechanisms Update a Trader's Reputation Profile. Information Systems Research 17(3):271-285. (Pubitemid 44371790)
    • (2006) Information Systems Research , vol.17 , Issue.3 , pp. 271-285
    • Dellarocas, C.1
  • 5
    • 84963061006 scopus 로고
    • Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed
    • Fudenberg, D., and Levine, D. K. 1992. Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed. Review of Economic Studies 59:561-579.
    • (1992) Review of Economic Studies , vol.59 , pp. 561-579
    • Fudenberg, D.1    Levine, D.K.2
  • 7
    • 34748894825 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Obtaining reliable feedback for sanctioning reputation mechanisms
    • Jurca, R., and Faltings, B. 2007. Obtaining Reliable Feedback for Sanctioning Reputation Mechanisms. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR) 29:391-419. (Pubitemid 47477597)
    • (2007) Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research , vol.29 , pp. 391-419
    • Jurca, R.1    Faltings, B.2
  • 9
    • 44149093434 scopus 로고
    • Reputation and imperfect information
    • Kreps, D. M., and Wilson, R. 1982. Reputation and Imperfect Information. Journal of Economic Theory 27(2):253-279.
    • (1982) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.27 , Issue.2 , pp. 253-279
    • Kreps, D.M.1    Wilson, R.2
  • 10
    • 25844515285 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Eliciting informative feedback: The peer-prediction method
    • DOI 10.1287/mnsc.1050.0379
    • Miller, N.; Resnick, P.; and Zeckhauser, R. 2005. Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method. Management Science 51(9):1359-1373. (Pubitemid 41394242)
    • (2005) Management Science , vol.51 , Issue.9 , pp. 1359-1373
    • Miller, N.1    Resnick, P.2    Zeckhauser, R.3
  • 11
    • 34547637688 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Trust among strangers in internet transactions: Empirical analysis of ebay's reputation system
    • Emerald Group Publishing
    • Resnick, P., and Zeckhauser, R. 2002. Trust Among Strangers in Internet Transactions: Empirical Analysis of eBay's Reputation System. In The Economics of the Internet and E-Commerce. Emerald Group Publishing.
    • (2002) The Economics of the Internet and E-Commerce
    • Resnick, P.1    Zeckhauser, R.2


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.