Eliciting honest reputation feedback in a Markov setting

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 330-335

  Witkowski, Jens ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BANDWIDTH; WEB SERVICES;

AVAILABLE BANDWIDTH; HONEST FEEDBACK; NATURAL GENERALIZATION; PAYMENT SCHEMES; PRODUCTS AND SERVICES; REAL WORLD SETTING; REPUTATION FEEDBACKS; REPUTATION MECHANISM;

HIDDEN MARKOV MODELS;

EID: 78751699252     PISSN: 10450823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (9)

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4. Radu Jurca and Boi Faltings. Enforcing Truthful Strategies in Incentive Compatible Reputation Mechanisms. In Internet and Network Economics. Springer-Verlag, 2005.
5. Radu Jurca and Boi Faltings. Minimum Payments that Reward Honest Reputation Feedback. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2006.
6. Radu Jurca and Boi Faltings. Collusionresistant, Incentive-compatible Feedback Payments. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2007.
7. Nolan Miller, Paul Resnick, and Richard Zeckhauser. Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method. Management Science, 2005.
8. David Parkes. Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and Computational Efficiency. PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 2001.
9. Justin Wolfers and Eric Zitzewitz. Prediction Markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2004.