Mechanism design via correlation gap

Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 710-719

  Yan, Qiqi ^a  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; MACHINE DESIGN;

CONSTANT FACTORS; CORRELATION GAPS; HIGHLY-CORRELATED; INDEPENDENT SET; MECHANISM DESIGN; OPTIMAL MECHANISM; SUBMODULAR FUNCTIONS; WELFARE MAXIMIZATIONS;

SET THEORY;

EID: 79955713647     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1137/1.9781611973082.56     Document Type: Conference Paper

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