Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle

Philosophical Review

Volumn 121, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 241-275

  Pettigrew, Richard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84859533049     PISSN: 00318108     EISSN: 15581470     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1215/00318108-1539098     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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15. Reprinted with added postscripts in Lewis, D., 1987. Philosophical Papers, vol. 2, 83-132. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. All references are to the original version.
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