The extended body: A case study in the neurophenomenology of social interaction

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

Volumn 11, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 205-235

  Froese, Tom ^a   Fuchs, Thomas ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO   (Japan)

^b UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL HEIDELBERG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Dynamical systems theory; Embodied intersubjectivity; Enaction; Social cognition

Indexed keywords

EID: 84862133969     PISSN: 15687759     EISSN: 15728676     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-012-9254-2     Document Type: Article

References (98)

1. Agnew, Z. K., Bhakoo, K. K., & Puri, B. K. (2007). The human mirror system: a motor resonance theory of mind-reading. Brain Research Reviews, 54, 286-293.
2. Auvray, M., Lenay, C., & Stewart, J. (2009). Perceptual interactions in a minimalist virtual environment. New Ideas in Psychology, 27(1), 32-47.
3. Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a "theory of mind"? Cognition, 21(1), 37-46.
4. Beer, R. D. (1995). A dynamical systems perspective on agent-environment interaction. Artificial Intelligence, 72(1-2), 173-215.
5. Beer, R. D. (2000). Dynamical approaches to cognitive science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(3), 91-99.
6. Beer, R. D. (2003). The dynamics of active categorical perception in an evolved model agent. Adaptive Behavior, 11(4), 209-243.
7. Boden, M. A. (2006). Of islands and interactions. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(5), 53-63.
8. Carruthers, P., & Smith, P. K. (Eds.) (1996). Theories of theories of mind. Cambridge University Press.
9. Clark, A. (1997). Being there: Putting brain, body, and world together again. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
10. Clark, A. (2008). Supersizing the mind: Embodiment, action, and cognitive extension. New York: Oxford University Press.
11. Clark, A. (2009). Spreading the joy? Why the machinery of consciousness is (probably) still in the head. Mind, 118(472), 963-993.
12. De Jaegher, H., & Di Paolo, E. A. (2007). Participatory sense-making: an enactive approach to social cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6(4), 485-507.
13. De Jaegher, H., Di Paolo, E., & Gallagher, S. (2010). Can social interaction constitute social cognition? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14(10), 441-447.
14. De Vignemont, F. (2004). The co-consciousness hypothesis. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 3, 97-114.
15. Di Paolo, E. A. (2009). Editorial: the social and enactive mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 8(4), 409-415.
16. Di Paolo, E. A., Noble, J., & Bullock, S. (2000). Simulation models as opaque thought experiments. In M. A. Bedau, J. S. McCaskill, N. H. Packard, & S. Rasmussen (Eds.), Artificial life VII: Proc. of the 7th Int. Conf. on artificial life (pp. 497-506). Cambridge: The MIT Press.
17. Di Paolo, E. A., Rohde, M., & Iizuka, H. (2008). Sensitivity to social contingency or stability of interaction? Modelling the dynamics of perceptual crossing. New Ideas in Psychology, 26(2), 278-294.
18. Di Paolo, E. A., Rohde, M., & De Jaegher, H. (2010). Horizons for the enactive mind: Values, social interaction, and play. In J. Stewart, O. Gapenne, & E. A. Di Paolo (Eds.), Enaction: Towards a new paradigm for cognitive science. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
19. Downing, G. (2004). Emotion, body and parent-infant interaction. In J. Nadel & D. Muir (Eds.), Emotional development: Recent research advances (pp. 429-449). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
20. Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). Social cognition (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
21. Fodor, J. A. (1992). A theory of the child's theory of mind. Cognition, 44, 283-296.
22. Froese, T. (2011). Breathing new life into cognitive science. Avant. The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard, 2(1), 113-129.
23. Froese, T., & Di Paolo, E. A. (2008). Stability of coordination requires mutuality of interaction in a model of embodied agents. In M. Asada, J. C. T. Hallam, J.-A. Meyer, & J. Tani (Eds.), From animals to animats 10: Proc. of the 10th Int. Conf. on simulation of adaptive behavior (pp. 52-61). Berlin: Springer.
24. Froese, T., & Di Paolo, E. A. (2010). Modeling social interaction as perceptual crossing: an investigation into the dynamics of the interaction process. Connection Science, 22(1), 43-68.
25. Froese, T., & Gallagher, S. (2010). Phenomenology and artificial life: toward a technological supplementation of phenomenological methodology. Husserl Studies, 26(2), 83-106.
26. Froese, T., & Di Paolo, E. A. (2011a). The enactive approach: theoretical sketches from cell to society. Pragmatics & Cognition, 19(1), 1-36.
27. Froese, T., & Di Paolo, E. A. (2011b). Toward minimally social behavior: Social psychology meets evolutionary robotics. In G. Kampis, I. Karsai, & E. Szathmáry (Eds.), Advances in artificial life. Darwin meets von Neumann. 10th European Conference, ECAL 2009 (pp. 426-433). Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
28. Froese, T., Gould, C., & Barrett, A. (2011). Re-viewing from within: a commentary on first- and second-person methods in the science of consciousness. Constructivist Foundations, 6(2), 254-269.
29. Fuchs, T. (1996). Leibliche Kommunikation und ihre Störungen. Zeitschrift fuer Klinische Psychologie Psychopathologie und Psychotherapie, 44, 415-428.
30. Fuchs, T. (2008). Leib und Lebenswelt: Neue philosophisch-psychiatrische essays. Kusterdingen: Die Graue Edition.
31. Fuchs, T. (2012). The phenomenology of body memory. In S. C. Koch, T. Fuchs, M. Summa, & C. Müller (Eds.), Body memory, metaphor and movement (pp. 9-22). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
32. Fuchs, T., & De Jaegher, H. (2009). Enactive intersubjectivity: participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 8(4), 465-486.
33. Gallagher, S. (1997). Mutual enlightenment: recent phenomenology in cognitive science. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4(3), 195-214.
34. Gallagher, S. (2005). How the body shapes the mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
35. Gallagher, S. (2007). Simulation trouble. Social Neuroscience, 2(3-4), 353-365.
36. Gallagher, S. (2008). Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(2), 535-543.
37. Gallagher, S. (2009). Two problems of intersubjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 16(6-8), 289-308.
38. Gallese, V. (2005). Embodied simulation: from neurons to phenomenal experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4, 23-48.
39. Gallese, V. (2007). Before and below 'theory of mind': embodied simulation and the neural correlates of social cognition. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 362, 659-669.
40. Gallese, V., Keysers, C., & Rizzolatti, G. (2004). A unifying view of the basis of social cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(9), 396-403.
41. Gergely, G., & Watson, J. (1999). Early social-emotional development: contingency perception and the social biofeedback model. In P. Rochat (Ed.), Early social cognition: Understanding others in the first months of life (pp. 101-137). Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum.
42. Giunti, M. (1995). Dynamical models of cognition. In R. F. Port & T. van Gelder (Eds.), Mind in motion: Explorations in the dynamics of cognition (pp. 549-572). Cambridge: The MIT Press.
43. Goldman, A., & de Vignemont, F. (2009). Is social cognition embodied? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13(4), 154-159.
44. Harvey, I., Di Paolo, E. A., Wood, R., Quinn, M., & Tuci, E. A. (2005). Evolutionary robotics: a new scientific tool for studying cognition. Artificial Life, 11(1-2), 79-98.
45. Heath, J. (2011). Methodological individualism. In: E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), URL = http://plato. stanford. edu/archives/spr2011/entries/methodological-individualism/.
46. Husserl, E. [1893-1917] (1969). Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917). In: Husserliana. Gesammelte Werke, Band 10. Berlin: Springer.
47. Hutchins, E. (1995). Cognition in the wild. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
48. Hutto, D. (2008). Folk psychological narratives: The sociocultural basis of understanding reasons. Cambridge: MIT Press.
49. Hutto, D., & Ratcliffe, M. (Eds.). (2010). Folk psychology re-assessed. Dordrecht: Springer.
50. Iizuka, H., & Di Paolo, E. A. (2007). Minimal agency detection of embodied agents. In F. Almeida e Costa, L. M. Rocha, E. Costa, I. Harvey, & A. Coutinho (Eds.), Advances in artificial life: Proc. of the 9th Euro. Conf. on artificial life (pp. 485-494). Berlin: Springer.
51. Ikegami, T., & Iizuka, H. (2007). Turn-taking interaction as a cooperative and co-creative process. Infant Behavior & Development, 30, 278-288.
52. Jackson, P. L., & Decety, J. (2004). Motor cognition: a new paradigm to study self-other interactions. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 14, 259-263.
53. Jacob, P., & Jeannerod, M. (2005). The motor theory of social cognition: a critique. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(1), 21-25.
54. Keysers, C., & Fadiga, L. (2008). The mirror neuron system: new frontiers. Social Neuroscience, 3(3-4), 193-198.
55. Krueger, J. (2012). Seeing mind in action. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
56. Lutz, A. (2002). Toward a neurophenomenology of generative passages: a first empirical case study. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1, 133-167.
57. Lutz, A., & Thompson, E. (2003). Neurophenomenology: integrating subjective experience and brain dynamics in the neuroscience of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10, 31-52.
58. Lyons-Ruth, K., Bruschweiler-Stern, N., Harrison, A. M., Morgan, A. C., Nahum, J. P., Sander, L., Stern, D. N., & Tronick, E. Z. (1998). Implicit relational knowing: its role in development and psychoanalytic treatment. Infant Mental Health Journal, 19, 282-289.
59. Merleau-Ponty, M. [1945]. Phénomènologie de la perception, trans. by: C. Smith (1962), Phenomenology of perception. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
60. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1960). "Les relations avec autrui chez l'enfant", Paris, France: Cours de Sorbonne, trans. by W. Cobb, "The Child's Relations with Others". In: M. Merleau-Ponty (1964), The Primacy of Perception And Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics, J. M. Edie (Ed.), (pp. 96-155). Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
61. Morganti, F., Carassa, A., & Riva, G. (Eds.). (2008). Enacting intersubjectivity: A cognitive and social perspective on the study of interactions. Amsterdam: Ios Press.
62. Murray, L., & Trevarthen, C. (1985). Emotional regulations of interactions between two-month-olds and their mothers. In T. M. Field & N. A. Fox (Eds.), Social perception in infants (pp. 177-197). Norwood: Alex.
63. Nadel, J., Carchon, I., Kervella, C., Marcelli, D., & Réserbat-Plantey, D. (1999). Expectancies for social contingency in 2-month-olds. Developmental Science, 2(2), 164-173.
64. Noë, A. (2004). Action in perception. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
65. Petitmengin, C., Navarro, V., & Le van Quyen, M. (2007). Anticipating seizure: pre-reflective experience at the center of neuron-phenomenology. Consciousness and Cognition, 16(3), 746-764.
66. Port, R. F., & van Gelder, T. (Eds.). (1995). Mind as motion: Explorations in the dynamics of cognition. Cambridge: MIT Press.
67. Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(4), 515-526.
68. Quinn, M., Smith, L., Mayley, G., & Husbands, P. (2003). Evolving controllers for a homogeneous system of physical robots: structured cooperation with minimal sensors. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London A, 361, 2321-2343.
69. Ratcliffe, M. (2007). Rethinking commonsense psychology: A critique of folk psychology, theory of mind and simulation. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
70. Reddy, V. (2008). How infants know minds. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
71. Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Gallese, V., & Fogassi, L. (1996). Premotor cortex and the recognition of motor actions. Cognitive Brain Research, 3, 131-141.
72. Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (1999). Resonance behaviors and mirror neurons. Archives Italiennes de Biologie, 137, 85-100.
73. Rizzolatti, G., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (2001). Neurophysiological mechanisms underlying the understanding and imitation of action. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2, 661-670.
74. Roy, J.-M., Petitot, J., Pachoud, B., & Varela, F. J. (1999). Beyond the gap: An introduction to naturalizing phenomenology. In J. Petitot, F. J. Varela, B. Pachoud, & J.-M. Roy (Eds.), Naturalizing phenomenology: Issues in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science (pp. 1-80). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
75. Spaulding, S. (2010). Embodied cognition and mindreading. Mind & Language, 25(1), 119-140.
76. Stawarska, B. (2006). Introduction: intersubjectivity and embodiment. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 5(1), 1-3.
77. Starwaska, B. (2009). Between you and I. Dialogical phenomenology. Ohio: Ohio University Press.
78. Stern, D. N. [1985] (1998). The interpersonal world of the infant: A view from psychoanalysis and developmental psychology. New York: Basic Books.
79. Stewart, J., Gapenne, O., & Di Paolo, E. A. (Eds.). (2010). Enaction: Towards a new paradigm for cognitive science. Cambridge: MIT Press.
80. Stich, S., & Nichols, S. (1991). Folk psychology: Simulation or tacit theory. Rutgers University.
81. Stout, R. (2012). What someone's behaviour must be like if we are to be aware of their emotions in it. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
82. Stuart, S. (2011), Enkinaesthesia, Biosemiotics and the Ethiosphere. Cybernetics & Human Knowing, forthcoming.
83. Summa, M. (2011). Das Leibgedächtnis. Ein Beitrag aus der Phänomenologie Husserls. Husserl Studies, 27, 173-196.
84. Thelen, E., & Smith, L. B. (1994). A dynamical systems approach to the development of cognition and action. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
85. Thompson, E. (2001). Empathy and consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8(5-7), 1-32.
86. Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in life: Biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
87. Torrance, S. (2009). Contesting the concept of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 16(5), 111-126.
88. Torrance, S., & Froese, T. (2011). An inter-enactive approach to agency: phenomenology, dynamics, and sociality. Humana Mente, 15, 21-53.
89. Trevarthen, C. B. (1979). Communication and cooperation in early infancy: A description of primary intersubjectivity. In M. Bullowa (Ed.), Before speech (pp. 321-347). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
90. Trevarthen, C. (2005). First things first: infants make good use of the sympathetic rhythm of imitation, without reason or language. Journal of Child Psychotherapy, 31(1), 91-113.
91. van Gelder, T. (1999). Wooden iron? Husserlian phenomenology meets cognitive science. In J. Petitot, F. J. Varela, B. Pachoud, & J.-M. Roy (Eds.), Naturalizing phenomenology: Issues in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science (pp. 245-265). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
92. Varela, F. J. (1996). Neurophenomenology: a methodological remedy for the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3(4), 330-349.
93. Varela, F. J. (1997). The naturalization of phenomenology as the transcendence of nature: searching for generative mutual constraints. Alter: Revue de Phénoménologie, 5, 355-381.
94. Varela, F. J. (1999). The specious present: a neurophenomenology of time consciousness. In J. Petitot, F. J. Varela, B. Pachoud, & J.-M. Roy (Eds.), Naturalizing phenomenology: Issues in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science (pp. 266-317). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
95. Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
96. Wheeler, M. (2005). Reconstructing the cognitive world: The next step. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
97. Zahavi, D. (2001). Beyond empathy: phenomenological approaches to intersubjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8(5-7), 151-167.
98. Zlatev, J., Racine, T. P., Sinha, C., & Itkonen, E. (Eds.) (2008). The shared mind: Perspectives on intersubjectivity. John Benjamins Publishing Company.