Phenomenology and artificial life: Toward a technological supplementation of phenomenological methodology

Husserl Studies

Volumn 26, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 83-106

  Froese, Tom ^a   Gallagher, Shaun ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77954022681     PISSN: 01679848     EISSN: 15728501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10743-010-9071-9     Document Type: Article

References (91)

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