Breathing new life into cognitive science;Tchna{ogonek}ć nowe zycie w kognitywistyke{ogonek}

Avant

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 113-129

  Froese, Tom ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84866510782     PISSN: None     EISSN: 20826710     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (55)

1. Auvray, M., Lenay, C. & Stewart, J. 2009. Perceptual interactions in a minimalist virtual environment. New Ideas in Psychology, 27(1): 32-47.
2. Barandiaran, X., Di Paolo, E. A. & Rohde, M. 2009. Defining Agency: Individuality, Normativity, Asymmetry, and Spatio-temporality in Action, Adaptive Behavior, 17(5): 367-386.
3. Barandiaran, X. & Moreno, A. 2006. On what makes certain dynamical systems cognitive: a minimally cognitive organization program", Adaptive Behavior, 14(2): 171-185.
4. Beer, R. D. 2003. The dynamics of active categorical perception in an evolved model agent, Adaptive Behavior, 11(4): 209-243.
5. De Jaegher, H. & Di Paolo, E. A. 2007. Participatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6(4): 485-507.
6. De Jaegher, H. & Froese, T. 2009. On the Role of Social Interaction in Individual Agency. Adaptive Behavior, 17(5): 444-460.
7. Di Paolo, E. A. 1997. An investigation into the evolution of communication. Adaptive Behavior, 6(2): 285-324.
8. Di Paolo, E. A. 2005. Autopoiesis, adaptivity, teleology, agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4(4). 429-452.
9. Di Paolo, E. A. 2009. Extended life. Topoi, 28(1): 9-21.
10. Froese, T. 2009. Sociality and the life-mind continuity thesis: a study in evolutionary robotics. D.Phil. Thesis, Brighton, UK: University of Sussex.
11. thth Int. Conf. on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior. Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag.
12. Froese, T. & Di Paolo, E. A. 2009. Sociality and the life-mind continuity thesis. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 8(4): 439-463.
13. Froese, T. & Di Paolo, E. A. (in press). The enactive approach: From cell to society. Pragmatics & Cognition, forthcoming.
14. th Euro. Conf. on Artificial Life. Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag.
15. Froese, T. & Gallagher, S. 2010. Phenomenology and Artificial Life: Toward a Technological Supplementation of Phenomenological Methodology. Husserl Studies, 26(2): 83-106.
16. Froese, T. & Stewart, J. 2010. Life after Ashby: Ultrastability and the autopoietic foundations of biological individuality. Cybernetics & Human Knowing, 17(4): 7-50.
17. Froese, T. & Ziemke, T. 2009. Enactive Artificial Intelligence: Investigating the systemic organization of life and mind. Artificial Intelligence, 173(3-4): 366-500.
18. Fuchs, T. (in press). Body memory and the unconscious. Eds. Lohmar, D. & Brudzinska, J. Founding Psychoanalysis: Phenomenological Theory of Subjectivity and the Psychoanalytical Experience. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
19. Gallagher, S. 2008. Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(2): 535-543.
20. Gallagher, S. 2009. Two problems of intersubjectivity: Journal of Consciousness Studies, 16(6-8): 289-308.
21. Gallagher, S. & Zahavi, D. 2008. The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. London, UK: Routledge.
22. Hanna, R. & Thompson, E. 2003. The Mind-Body-Body Problem. Theoria et Historia Scientarum, 7(1): 24-44.
23. Jonas, H. 1966 [2001]. The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.
24. Lutz, A. & Thompson, E. 2003. Neurophenomenology: integrating subjective experience and brain dynamics in the neuroscience of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10: 31-52.
25. Noë, A. 2004. Action in Perception. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
26. Noë, A. 2009. Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness. New York, NY: Hill and Wang.
27. O'Regan, J.K. & Noë, A. 2001. a sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(5): 939-1031.
28. nd edition. Durham: Duke University Press.
29. Petitmengin, C. 2006. Describing one's subjective experience in the second person: An interview method for the science of consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Scienceş 5(3-4): 229-269.
30. Port, R. F. & van Gelder, T. Eds. 1995. Mind as Motion: Explorations in the Dynamics of Cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
31. Rohde, M. 2010. Enaction, Embodiment, Evolutionary Robotics: Simulation Models for a Post-Cognitivist Science of Mind. Atlantis Press.
32. Roy, J.-M., Petitot, J., Pachoud, B. & Varela, F. J. 1999. Beyond the Gap: An Introduction to Naturalizing Phenomenology: 1-80. Eds. Petitot, J., Varela, F. J., Pachoud, B. & Roy, J.-M. Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
33. Ruiz-Mirazo, K. & Moreno, A. 2004. Basic Autonomy as a Fundamental Step in the Synthesis of Life. Artificial Life, 10(3): 235-259.
34. Savage-Rumbaugh, S., Shanker, S. G. & Taylor, T. J. 1998. Apes, Language, and the Human Mind. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
35. Shanker, S. G. & King, B. J. 2002. The emergence of a new paradigm in ape language research. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25(5): 605-620.
36. Sheets-Johnstone, M. 1999. The Primacy of Movement. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing.
37. Smith, L. & Thelen, E. 2003. Development as a dynamical system. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(8): 343-348.
38. Stanghellini, G. 2004. Disembodied Spirits and Deanimated Bodies: The psychopathology of common sense. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
39. Stawarska, B. 2009. Between You and I: Dialogical Phenomenology. Athens: Ohio University Press.
40. Stewart, J., Gapenne, O. & Di Paolo, E. A. Eds. 2010. Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
41. Thelen, E. & Smith, L. B. 1994. a dynamical systems approach to the development of cognition and action. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
42. Thompson, E. 2004. Life and mind: From autopoiesis to neurophenomenology. a tribute to Francisco Varela. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 3(4): 381-398.
43. Thompson, E. 2005. Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach to experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4(4): 407-427.
44. Thompson, E. 2007. Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
45. Torrance, S. & Froese, T. 2011. An inter-enactive approach to agency: Participatory sense-making, dynamics, and sociality. Humana.Mente, 15: 21-53.
46. Maturana, H.R., & Varela, F. J. 1987. The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human Understanding. Boston, MA: Shambhala Publications.
47. McMullin, B. 2004. Thirty Years of Computational Autopoiesis: a Review. Artificial Life, 10(3): 277-295.
48. Varela, F. J. 1996. Neurophenomenology: a Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3(4): 330-349.
49. Varela, F. J. 1997. Patterns of Life: Intertwining Identity and Cognition. Brain and Cognition, 34(1): 72-87.
50. Varela, F. J, Thompson, E. & Rosch, E. 1991. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
51. Virgo, N., Egbert, M. & Froese, T. (forthcoming). The Role of the Spatial Boundary in Autopoiesis. Proc. of the 10th Euro. Conf. on Artificial Life. Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag.
52. Weber, A. & Varela, F. J. 2002. Life after Kant: Natural purposes and the autopoietic foundations of biological individuality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1: 97-125.
53. Zahavi, D. 2001. Beyond Empathy: Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8(5-7): 151-167.
54. Zahavi, D. 2005. Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
55. Zahavi, D. 2006. Two takes on a one-level account of consciousness. Psyche, 12(2): 1-9.