The Sources of Intentionality

The Sources of Intentionality

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 1-288

  Kriegel, Uriah ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

Consciousness; Experience; Intentionality; Tracking

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861744751     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199742974.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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