Recent work on intentionality

Analysis

Volumn 70, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 765-782

  Montague, Michelle ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77957817411     PISSN: 00032638     EISSN: 14678284     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anq090     Document Type: Review

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