Two conceptions of sparse properties

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 85, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 92-102

  Schaffer, Jonathan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547231954     PISSN: 02790750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2004.00189.x     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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