Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties

Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-240

  Bird, Alexander ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Armstrong; Dispositions; Essentialism; Laws of nature; Lewis; Metaphysics; Necessity; Potency; Powers; Properties

Indexed keywords

EID: 34948849291     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227013.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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