The spatial content of experience

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Volumn 81, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 146-184

  Thompson, Brad ^a  

^a SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77954358783     PISSN: 00318205     EISSN: 19331592     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00359.x     Document Type: Article

References (52)

1. Block N. Advertisement for a semantics for psychology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 1986, 10:615-77.
2. Boghossian P, Velleman D. Colour as a secondary quality. Mind 1989, 98:81-103.
3. Burge T. Demonstrative constructions, reference, and truth. Journal of Philosophy 1974, 71:205-223.
4. Burge T. Individualism and the mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 1979, 4:73-121.
5. Burge T. Individualism and psychology. Philosophical Review 1986, 95:3-45.
6. Byrne A, Hilbert D. Colors and reflectances. Readings on Color 1997, Byrne A, Hilbert D. In, eds, vol. 1, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press
7. Campbell J. A simple view of colour. Reality, Representation and Projection 1993, Haldane JWright C. In, eds, Oxford, Oxford University Press
8. Campbell J. Molyneux's question. Perception (Philosophical Issues 7) 1996, Villanueva E. In, ed, Atascadero, Ridgeview
9. Chalmers D. On sense and intension. Philsophical Perspectives 2002, 16:135-82.
10. Chalmers D. The representational character of experience. The Future for Philosophy 2004, Leiter B. In, ed, Oxford, Oxford University Press
11. Crane T. All the difference in the world. Philosophical Quarterly 1991, 41:1-25.
12. Davies M. Individualism and perceptual content. Mind 1991, 100:461-84.
13. Davies M. Aims and claims of externalist arguments. Philosophical Issues 1993, 4:227-249.
14. Dretske F. Naturalizing the Mind 1995, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press
15. Evans G. Understanding Demonstratives. Meaning and Understanding 1981, Parret HBouveresse J. in, eds, Berlin, de Gruyter, Reprinted in G. Evans, 1985, Oxford: Oxford University Press
16. Evans G. The Varieties of Reference 1982, Oxford, Oxford University Press
17. Evans G. Collected Papers 1985, Oxford, Oxford University Press
18. Fodor J. Psychosemantics 1987, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press
19. Hardin C L. Color for Philosopher: Unweaving the Rainbow Hackett Publishing Company
20. Harman G. The intrinsic quality of experience. Philosophical Perspectives 1990, 4:31-52.
21. Harris C. Perceptual adaptation to inverted, reversed, and displaced vision. Psychological Review 1965, 72:419-444.
22. Horgan T, Tienson J. The intentionality of phenomenology and the phenomenology of intentionality. Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings 2002, Chalmers D, In, ed, Oxford, Oxford University Press
23. Horgan T. Phenomenal intentionality and the brain in a vat. The Externalist Challenge 2004, Schantz R. In, ed, Walter de Gruyter
24. Hurley S. Consciousness in Action 1998, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press
25. Jackson F. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis 1998, Oxford, Oxford University Press
26. Kaplan D. Demonstratives. Themes from Kaplan 1989, Almog JPerry JWettstein H. In, eds, Oxford, Oxford University Press
27. Lewis D. Index, context, and content. Philosophy and Grammar 1980, Kanger SOhman S. In, eds, Dordrecht, Reidel, Reprinted in D. Lewis, 1998, , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
28. Loar B. Social content and psychological content. Contents of Thought 1988, Grimm RMerrill P. In, eds, Tucson, AZ, University of Arizona Press
29. Locke J. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 1975, Nidditch P H. Ed, Oxford, Oxford University Press
30. Lycan W. The case for phenomenal externalism. Philosophical Perspectives 2001
31. Maund J. Colours: Their Nature and Representation 1995, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
32. McDowell J. On the sense and reference of a proper name. Mind 1977, 86:159-85.
33. McGinn C. Mental Content 1989, Oxford, Blackwell
34. McGinn C. Another look at color. Journal of Philosophy 1997, 93:537-53.
35. Morgan M. Molyneux's Question: Vision, Touch and the Philosophy of Perception 1977, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
36. Nassau K. The causes of color. Scientific American 1980, 243:124-54.
37. Nida-Rumelin M. Pseudonormal vision: An actual case of qualia inversion? Philosophical Studies 1996, 82:145-57.
38. Peacocke C. Scenarios, concepts and perception. The Contents of Experience 1992, Crane T. In, Ed, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
39. Poincaré H. The Value of Science 1958, New York, Dover
40. Putnam H. The meaning of " meaning" Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: Mind, Language and Reality 1975, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
41. Segal G. A Slim Book about Narrow Content 2000, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press
42. Shoemaker S. Self-knowledge and " inner-sense" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1994, LIV:249-314.
43. Shoemaker S. Introspection and phenomenal character. Philosophical Topics 2001
44. Shoemaker S. On the way things appear. Perceptual Experience 2006, Gendler THawthorne J. In, Eds, Oxford, Oxford University Press
45. Siewert C. The Significance of Consciousness 1998, Princeton University Press
46. Thompson B. Shoemaker on phenomenal content. Philosophical Studies 2007, 135:307-334.
47. Thompson B. Representationalism and the argument from hallucination. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 2008, 89:384-412.
48. Thompson B. Senses for senses. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 2009, 87:99-117.
49. Tye M. Ten Problems of Consciousness 1995, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press
50. Tye M. Consciousness, Color, and Content 2000, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press
51. Tye M. Nonconceptual content, richness, and fineness of grain. Perceptual Experience 2006, Gendler THawthorne J. In, Eds, Oxford, Oxford University Press
52. White S. Partial character and the language of thought. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 1982, 63:347-65.