Paradigms and sand castles: Theory building and research design in comparative politics

Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-314

  Geddes, Barbara ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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EID: 85058920151     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

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