Secure property as a bottom-up process firms, stakeholders, and predators in weak states

World Politics

Volumn 64, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 242-277

  Markus, Stanislav ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BOTTOM-UP APPROACH; DEVELOPING WORLD; INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE; POLITICAL ECONOMY; PROPERTY RIGHTS; SECURITY; STAKEHOLDER; STATE ROLE;

EID: 84859967399     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: 10863338     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0043887112000044     Document Type: Article

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