Seize the state, seize the day: State capture and influence in transition economies

Journal of Comparative Economics

Volumn 31, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 751-773

  Hellman, Joel S ^a   Jones, Geraint ^b   Kaufmann, Daniel ^a  

^a WORLD BANK   (United States)

^b MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Capture; Corruption; Influence; Property rights; State capture; Transition economies

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347281675     PISSN: 01475967     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2003.09.006     Document Type: Article

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