Public protection or private extortion?

Economics and Politics

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 1-32

  de Mesquita, Ethan Bueno ^a,c   Hafer, Catherine ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CORRUPTION; LAW ENFORCEMENT; PUBLIC SPENDING; STATE ROLE; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 38649122041     PISSN: 09541985     EISSN: 14680343     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00314.x     Document Type: Article

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