Public choice: A critical reassessment

Government and Markets: Toward a New Theory of Regulation

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 213-255

  Leight, Jessica ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84858592370     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511657504.008     Document Type: Chapter

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