A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy

Economic Theory

Volumn 49, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 703-738

  Baron, David P ^a   Diermeier, Daniel ^b   Fong, Pohan ^c  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c CITY UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

Government formation; Inefficiency; Lack of commitment; Parliamentary democracy; Policy dynamics; Proportional representation

Indexed keywords

EID: 84858283678     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0625-7     Document Type: Article

References (37)

1. Aghion P., Bolton P.: Government domestic debt and the risk of default: A political-economic model of strategic role of debt. In: Dornbusch, R., Dradhi, M. (eds) Public Debt Management: Theory and History, pp. 121-145. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1990).
2. Austen-Smith D., Banks J. S.: Elections, coalitions, and legislative outcomes. Am Polit Sci Rev 82(2), 405-422 (1988).
3. Austen-Smith D., Banks J. S.: Positive Political Theory II: Strategy and Structure. The University of Michigan Press, Michigan (2005).
4. Baron D. P.: A dynamic theory of collective goods programs. Am Polit Sci Rev 90(2), 316-330 (1996).
5. Baron D. P., Herron M.: A dynamic model of multidimensional collective choice. In: Kollman, K., Miller, J. H., Page, S. E. (eds) Computational Models of Political Economy, pp. 13-47. MIT Press, Cambridge (2003).
6. Baron D. P., Diermeier D.: Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems. Q J Econ 116(3), 933-967 (2001).
7. Baron, D. P., Hirsch, A.: Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy. Econ Theory (2011, forthcoming).
8. Battaglini M., Coate S.: Inefficiency in legislative policy-making: a dynamic analysis. Am Econ Rev 97(1), 118-149 (2007).
9. Battaglini M., Coate S.: A dynamic theory of public spending, taxation and debt. Am Econ Rev 98(1), 201-236 (2008).
10. Battaglini, M., Palfrey, T.: The dynamics of distributive politics. Econ Theory (2011, forthcoming).
11. Bawn K.: Voter responses to electoral complexity: ticket splitting, rational voters and representation in the Federal Republic of Germany. Br J Polit Sci 29(3), 487-505 (1999).
12. Besley T., Coate S.: Sources of inefficiency in a representative democracy: a dynamic analysis. Am Econ Rev 88(1), 139-156 (1998).
13. Bowen, R., Zahra, Z.: On dynamic compromise. Manuscript (2007).
14. Budge I., Klingemann H.-D., Volkens A., Bara J., Tanenbaum E.: Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945-1998. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2001).
15. Cho, S.-J.: Three-party competition in parliamentary democracy with proportional representation. Manuscript (2008).
16. Cox G. W.: Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1997).
17. Diermeier D., Eraslan H., Marlo A.: A structural model of government formation. Econometrica 71, 27-70 (2003).
18. Diermeier D., Feddersen J. T.: Cohesion in legislatures and the vote of confidence procedure. Am Polit Sci Rev 92(3), 611-621 (1998).
19. Diermeier D., Merlo A.: Government turnover in parliamentary democracies. J Econ Theory 94, 46-79 (2000).
20. Diermeier D., Merlo A.: An empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures. J Public Econ 88, 783-797 (2004).
21. Duggan, J., Kalandrakis, A. T.: A dynamic model of legislative bargaining. Manuscript (2007).
22. Fong, P.: Dynamics of government and policy choice. Manuscript (2006).
23. Kalandrakis A.: A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game. J Econ Theory 16, 294-322 (2004).
24. Kalandrakis A.: Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games. Econ Theory 28(2), 309-329 (2006).
25. Kalandrakis, A.: Majority rule dynamics with endogenous status quo. Manuscript (2007).
26. Laver M., Schofield N.: Multiparty Governments: the politics of coalition in Europe. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1990).
27. Lizzeri A., Persico N.: The provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives. Am Econ Rev 91, 225-239 (2001).
28. Persson T., Svensson L.: Why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit: policy with time-inconsistency preferences. Q J Econ 104, 325-345 (1989).
29. Persson T., Tabellini G.: The size and scope of government: comparative politics with rational politicians. Eur Econ Rev 43, 699-735 (1999).
30. Persson T., Tabellini G.: Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policies. MIT Press, Cambridge (2000).
31. Persson T., Tabellini G.: The Economic Effects of Constitutions. MIT Press, Cambridge (2003).
32. Persson T., Roland G., Tabellini G.: Comparative politics and public finance. J Polit Econ 108(6), 1121-1161 (2000).
33. Persson T., Roland G., Tabellini G.: Electoral rules and government spending in parliamentary democracies. Q J Polit Sci 2, 155-188 (2007).
34. Schofield N., Sened I.: Multiparty Democracy: Elections and Legislative Politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2006).
35. Strom K.: Minority Government and Majority Rule. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1990).
36. Tabellini G., Alesina A.: Voting on the budget deficit. Am Econ Rev 80(1), 37-49 (1990).
37. Volpin P. F., Pagano M.: The political economy of corporate governance. Am Econ Rev 95(4), 1005-1030 (2005).